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Abstract: A secure roaming protocol for mobile networks is proposed. Roaming has been analysed in some
schemes from the security point of view; however, there are vulnerabilities in most of them and so the
claimed security level is not achieved. The scheme offered by Wan et al. recently is based on hierarchical
identity-based encryption, in which the roaming user and the foreign network mutually authenticate each
other without the help of the home network. Although the idea behind this proposal is interesting, it
contradicts technical considerations such as routing and billing. The proposed protocol makes use of similar
functions used in Wan et al.’s scheme but contributes a distinguished structure that overcomes the previous
shortcomings and achieves a higher possible level of security in mobile roaming as well as enhancing the
security of the key issuing procedure.1 Introduction
Owing to the tremendous development in wireless
technology, user mobility has become an important
network feature. Subscribers of a speciﬁc service network
may wish to go outside the pre-scheduled coverage zone,
which necessitates the indirect connection for accessing the
services via foreign networks (FNs) (referred as roaming).
There are three parties involved in a roaming scenario:
a roaming user U, the user’s home network (HN) and a
visited FN, which has a roaming agreement with the user’s
HN. The user needs to be identiﬁed as an authorised
subscriber of his HN in order to obtain the services from
the FN. This will be achieved through a registration and
authentication procedure between the user and the foreign
server, which possibly will require the cooperation of the
user’s HN.
As a result of the open access nature of the radio interface
in wireless transmission, more security measures should be
provided in wireless networks compared to the wired
networks. One of the prominent security issues in such
networks is user’s privacy. To preserve this feature, not
only should user’s identity be protected (anonymity
requirement), but also his location and the relation between
his activities should be kept secret (untraceabilityT Inf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, pp. 93–103
i: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2009.0154requirement). The violation of each of the mentioned
requisites can seriously endanger the user’s privacy. This
problem is even more serious in a roaming scenario since a
new entity, which is called FN, participates in all activities.
So, the user’s privacy should strongly be considered during
the registration and authentication procedure in a roaming
scenario.
Samfat et al. [1] have proposed a comprehensive
classiﬁcation for different levels of privacy protection
according to the knowledge of different entities about the
user’s identiﬁcation information. The classiﬁcations are as
follows:
† C1: Each user is anonymous to eavesdroppers and his
activities are unlinkable to them.
† C2: In addition to C1, each user is anonymous to the
foreign servers and his activities are unlinkable to them.
† C3: In addition to C2, the relationship between the user
and servers (the home server and the foreign servers) is
anonymous for eavesdroppers.
† C4: In addition to C3, the home server of the user is
anonymous to the foreign servers.93
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activities are unlinkable to his home server.
It is mentioned in [1] that the levels C4 and C5 may be
contradictory with other (unrelated to security) system
requirements such as routing and billing. By introducing
new techniques like onion routing [2], however, it has
become realisable that the location information of
participating users be even protected against their HNs
without impeding the calls to be routed towards the users.
In these techniques, each user submits a temporary number
to the network. The network uses this number whenever it
wants to page that user [3]. The solutions like this are
mostly aimed at providing communication anonymity by
means of anonymous routing algorithms in the context of
mobile ad hoc networks. For example, the users need onion
proxies that know the network topology [4].
The scenario that we consider in this paper is more
compatible with the existing mobile network infrastructures
in which the user needs to be reachable at any moment by a
single identiﬁcation (phone number). This necessitates that
the home server be always aware of the mobile user’s
location in order to route the incoming calls towards the
user. Moreover, the foreign server should know the identity
of the home server for billing purposes. Therefore, it seems
that the admissible level of privacy protection in this
scenario is C3 (note that we are not considering applications
like e-cash, Internet surﬁng and e-mail checking in mobile
networks).
The universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS),
the third generation of mobile technology, provides a limited
C1 class of privacy protection. In UMTS, similar to global
system for mobile communication (the predecessor of
UMTS), the roaming user sends his international mobile
subscriber identity (IMSI) in clear during the ﬁrst
registration and receives a series of aliases known as
temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI) for
subsequent sessions. By using a different TMSI in each
session, anonymity requirement is fulﬁlled to some extent;
however, an adversary who continuously eavesdrops the
radio interface can identify the user’s IMSI and track his
location.
A lot of schemes address the privacy of users in mobile
networks [5–8]; however, they are mainly concentrated on
the case where the user is in his home domain and so
anonymity against the foreign servers is not investigated.
As a result, they cannot be implemented in the roaming
scenario. There are a number of other schemes which are
claimed to achieve C2 class of anonymity for roaming in
UMTS [9–12], but some of them do not provide the
security level they claim. For example, the scheme in [9] is
vulnerable to deposit-case attack [13]. In the schemes
proposed in [10, 12], there is some information leakage
about the roaming user’s identity from the parameters
presented to the visited FNs. Hence, these schemes onlyThe Institution of Engineering and Technology 2010provide C1 class of privacy. It seems that the only secure
protocol which meets the C2 level of anonymity is
presented in [11]; however, this protocol does not provide
some security features such as key veriﬁcation. The protocol
in [11] is based on public key cryptosystem. Although
mobile phones in the market today are powerful enough to
run public key cryptography computations at reasonable
speeds, it still involves the difﬁculties of a public key
infrastructure (PKI).
Wan et al. [14] have recently proposed a privacy-preserving
roaming protocol based on hierarchical identity-based
encryption (IBE) [15] for mobile networks. This protocol
is claimed to attain a new class of privacy protection, which
is deﬁned as follows:
† C52: In addition to C3, each user is anonymous and his
activities are unlinkable to his home server, while foreign
servers are allowed to know the identity of the home server.
As mentioned earlier, this security level necessitates a new
infrastructure to make it possible for the HN to route the
incoming calls towards the user, but no compensating
infrastructure is taken into account in [14]. In the standard
UMTS, the HN should be aware of the location of its users
in order to route the incoming calls towards them. So,
location privacy to the home server seems meaningless.
Moreover, the FN should be able to prove the HN that it is
serving one of the HN’s users and asks for its payment.
Besides the mentioned network issues, there is an
anonymous key issuing protocol in [14] which sometimes
fails the claimed level of security. In [14], every authorised
user needs a pseudonym and a corresponding key to take
part in a roaming scenario. However, it is assumed that a
number of these requisite pairs (pseudonyms and temporary
keys) are given to the users each time they participate in a
key issuing protocol with their home server. In the case that
a roaming user resides out of his HN domain for a long
time, he would run out of pseudonyms and keys. This
necessitates establishment of a connection between the user
and its home server in order to receive a new set of the
required roaming pairs. Since this connection should be held
via the FNs, some information about the identity of the user
and his home server reveals to the FNs which even
contradicts the C2 security requirements.
According to the above discussions, the most perfect and
practical scheme that is proposed so far, achieves the C2
class of anonymity and the possible C3 class is not provided
in UMTS yet. In this paper, we propose a roaming
protocol with enhanced security for mobile networks. Our
proposed protocol, like Wan et al.’s, beneﬁts from the
hierarchical identity-based cryptosystem and related
functions. Indeed, in our protocol, it is assumed that the
hierarchical identity-based cryptosystem is implemented
in the system for the purpose of encryption and
authentication. In spite of similarity in the case of




www.ietdl.orget al.’s to much extent. Owing to this variation, our protocol
achieves the acceptable C3 level of privacy. This alteration is
mainly concentrated on the structure of users’ temporary keys.
The temporary keys are generated for the users in order that
they could prove their obligation to their home servers. Our
scheme is designed in such a way that the users are able to
calculate their temporary keys themselves instead of the
home servers, that is, while both the HN and the FN
should participate in the key issuing procedure, only the
user has the ability to compute his next temporary key.
Also, the foreign server needs the cooperation of the home
server to authenticate the roaming user. However, the
foreign server obtains no information about the user’s
identity or permanent key during this collaboration.
Likewise, the home server does not gain any information
about the user’s pseudonym or the corresponding key used
for authentication between the user and the foreign server.
These added security features guarantee the acceptable C3
level of privacy in our protocol. We compare the security
features of our roaming protocol with those of previous
ones and show that our protocol has reached the C3
security level with one additional local signalling compared
to the best previous result [11] which achieves C2.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, the concepts of identity-based and hierarchical
IBE are described and the functions e and h are introduced
which play major roles in our protocol. In Section 3, Wan
et al.’s roaming protocol is reviewed and its drawbacks are
described in details. Our enhanced roaming protocol is
presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the security features
of the proposed protocol are evaluated. The protocol is
compared with the previous works in Section 6. A brief
comparison between the new roaming protocol and the one
in [11] is also presented in this section. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminary
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the concept of IBE as
well as hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes. In 1984, Shamir
[16] asked for an identity-based cryptosystem; however, the
ﬁrst well-designed IBE was not released until 2001 [17].
Recall that an IBE is a public key cryptosystem in which
the public key takes any arbitrary string like a name or an
e-mail address and the private key generator (PKG) could
produce a private key corresponding to each string. Hence,
one can encrypt a message by a public key even if the
public key’s owner has not yet set-up his private key. An
IBE scheme has a number of inherent advantages over the
public key cryptosystems such as easier revocation of public
keys and delegation of decryption keys [17]. In addition,
there is no need to store the public keys in a database
(PKI) in IBE systems.
An IBE scheme consists of four randomised algorithms:
set-up, extraction, encryption and decryption. Before
explaining these algorithms, it is necessary to introduce theT Inf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, pp. 93–103
i: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2009.0154concept of a bilinear map between two groups which is
used in IBE scheme and will be employed frequently in our
protocol.
Let G1 be an additive group and G2 be a multiplicative
group, both of order q for some large prime q (e.g. 160
bits). We say that a map e : G1 × G1  G2 is an
admissible bilinear map if:
1. e(aP, bQ) ¼ e(P, Q)ab for all a, b [ Zq and P, Q [ G1
(bilinear condition).
2. The map does not send all elements of G1 × G1 to the
identity element of G2 (non-degeneracy condition).
3. There is an efﬁcient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all
P, Q [ G1 (computability condition).
An example of groups G1 and G2 and a bilinear map
between them can be found in [17]. In that example, G1 is
a subgroup of the additive group of points of an elliptic
curve E/Fp and G2 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group
of a ﬁnite ﬁeld F ∗p2 .
The existence of an admissible bilinear map e : G1 ×
G1  G2 leads to the following results in groups G1 and
G2 [17].
† The decision Difﬁe–Hellman problem in G1 is easy, that
is, it is easy to distinguish between the distributions kP, aP,
bP, abPl and kP, aP, bP, cPl where a, b and c are random in
Z∗q and P is random in G
∗
1 but the computational Difﬁe–
Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 can be still hard (it is hard
to ﬁnd abP given random kP, aP, bPl).
† The bilinearDifﬁe–Hellman (BDH) problem in kG1,G2, el
is not harder than the CDH in G1 or G2, but the converse is
still an open problem. The BDH problem in kG1, G2, el is as
follows: given kP, aP, bP, cPl for some a, b, c in Z∗q compute
W ¼ e(P, P)abc[ G2.
For further study on the relationship between the
mentioned problems, refer to [18].
Remark 1: Consider the isomorphism induced from G1 to
G2 by the bilinear map e. More speciﬁcally, for a point
Q [ G∗1 deﬁne the isomorphism fQ: G1  G2 by fQ(P) ¼
e(P, Q). As mentioned in [17], an efﬁcient algorithm for
inverting fQ for some Q results in an efﬁcient algorithm
for solving CDH problem in G2. Consequently, the
isomorphism fQ is believed to be a one-way function
whenever CDH is believed to be hard in G2 as is the case
in all of the examples in [17]. Therefore throughout this
paper the bilinear map e is considered as a one-way
function (P cannot be inferred from e(P,Q) and Q).
Let n be the length of the message to be encrypted. The
IBE scheme is as follows:95
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random secret s [ Z∗q. Choose cryptographic hash functions
H1: {0, 1}∗  G∗1, H2: G2  {0, 1}n, H3: {0, 1}n × {0,
1}n  Z∗q and H4: {0, 1}n  {0, 1}n. In this system, the
public parameters are {G1, G2, e, P, sP, H1, H2, H3, H4} and
the master key is s.
Extraction: Each user’s identity-based private key should be
computed as kU ¼ sH1(U ), where U [ {0, 1}∗ is the user’s
identity.
Encryption: To encrypt M [ {0, 1}n using the public key U,
choose a random s [ {0, 1}n and set r ¼ H3(s, M ). The
ciphertext will be kC ¼ rP, s ⊕ H2 ( gUr ), M ⊕ H4(s)l,
where gU ¼ e(H1(U ), sP) [ G2.
Decryption: Let C ¼ kX, Y, Zl be a ciphertext encrypted with
U. If X  G∗1 , reject the ciphertext. Otherwise, compute
Y ⊕ H2(e(kU, X )) ¼ s and Z ⊕ H4(s) ¼M. If X ¼ H3(s,
M )P, report M as the decryption of C.
The above IBE scheme is resistant to the chosen ciphertext
attack, assuming the hardness of the BDH problem [17].
Similar to public key cryptosystems, a hierarchy of PKGs is
desirable in an IBE system to reduce the workload on
master servers. A two-level HIBE (2-HIBE) is presented in
[15]. There are three entities involved in a 2-HIBE scheme:
a root PKG which possesses a master key s, domain PKGs
which gain their domain keys from the root PKG and users
with private keys generated by their domain PKGs. The
2-HIBE scheme beneﬁts from a linear one-way function
h: G1 × Z∗q  G1 with the following properties:
1. For all P [ G1, a, x [ Z
∗
q, h(aP, x) ¼ ah(P, x).
2. Given x, xi [ Z
∗
q, P [ G1 and kxi, h(aP, xi)l for i ¼ 1, . . . ,
n, h(aP, x) could not be computed with any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm.
Remark 2: The function h deﬁned above is a one-way
function with respect to its ﬁrst argument, that is, P cannot
be inferred from h(P, x) and x.
The 2-HIBE system is deﬁned as follows:
Set-up: Pick a random generator P [ G1 and a random secret
s [ Z∗q. Choose cryptographic hash functions: H1: {0,
1}∗  G1, H2: {0, 1}∗  Z∗q and H3: G2  {0, 1}n. The
public parameters are {G1, G2, e, P, sP, H1, H2, H3} and
the master key is s.
KeyGen1: The key for domain S is kS ¼ sH1(S) [ G1.
KeyGen2: The key for user U in domain S is kU ¼ h(kS,
H2(S‖U )) [ G1.
Encryption: To encrypt M [ {0, 1}n with use of the
public key kS, Ul, choose a random r[Z∗q. The ciphertextThe Institution of Engineering and Technology 2010will be C ¼ krP, M ⊕ H3( g)l, where g ¼ e(h(H1(S),
H2(S‖U )), sP)r.
Decryption: Let C ¼ krP, Xl be a ciphertext encrypted
with kS, Ul. Compute M¼X ⊕ H3(e(kU, rP)) as the
decryption of C.
3 Review of Wan et al.’s roaming
protocol
In this section, we will review the roaming protocol proposed
by Wan et al. [14] and discuss its defects. The protocol
utilises a 2-HIBE scheme for both authentication/key
agreement and encryption. A master secret s is generated
by a trusted root server and the public key consists of {G1,
G2, e, P, sP, H1, H2, H3} (H1, H2 and H3 are the hash
functions introduced in the deﬁnition of the 2-HIBE
scheme and P is a random generator of G1). Also, the root
server generates a domain key kS ¼ sH1(S) for a server with
the identity S.
When a user registers at his home domain HS with his real
identity U, he receives a private key K ¼ h(kHS, H2(HS‖U ))
from the HS. Afterwards, whenever the home server receives
a number of aliases Nym1, . . . , Nymn from the user U during
a key issuing procedure, it computes the corresponding keys
ki ¼ h(kHS, H2(HS‖Nymi)) and sends them back to the
user. The roaming protocol is depicted in Fig. 1.
As shown in Fig. 1, the roaming protocol consists of four
message transmissions at the end of which, the foreign server
and the roaming user authenticate each other and agree on
the session keys sks and sku, respectively, such that
sku ¼ sks. H4 is a hash function which maps {0, 1}∗ to {0,
1}l for some security parameter l and ES(X ) denotes the
ID-based encryption of message X with the public key S.
As illustrated in the ﬁgure, in this protocol only the
roaming user and the FN server are involved, without
assistance of the user’s HN.
The user U needs an unused pseudonym Nymi and the
corresponding private key ki each time he participates in a
roaming protocol within a FN’s zone. Hence, when he uses
up his private keys, he should resubmit new pseudonyms to
his home server in order to obtain new private keys. This
will be done through a private ID-based key issuing
procedure as follows (the steps are exactly quoted from [14]):
1. The userU chooses a random number Nu and a number of
pseudonyms Nymi, i ¼ 1, . . . , n and encrypts them using the
home server’s public key. He computes a signature using his
ID-based key and sends U, Nu, EHS (Nym1, . . . , Nymn, Nu),
SigU (U, Nu, Nym1, . . . , Nymn) to the home server.
2. The home server decrypts the ciphertext to obtain Nymi
and Nu, and veriﬁes the signature. If the signature is valid,
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back to the user.
3. The user decrypts the ciphertext to obtain ki, Nu and Ns.
He also veriﬁes the signature in the message and accepts ki if
the signature is valid.
The problem of Wan et al.’s roaming protocol becomes
evident when the user participates in the key issuing
procedure while connecting to the HN via a foreign server.
Since all the messages are sent from the foreign server, the
home server becomes aware of the user’s location which
contradicts the claimed privacy level (C5− ). Besides, the
user sends his real identity in clear which contravenes
even the C1 requirements. Even if we accept that the
user encrypts his message with the foreign server’s
public key before sending, at least the FN is aware of
user’s identity which contradicts the C2 requirements. Note
that we cannot assume that the anonymous key issuing
protocol is just supposed to be used during the registration
phase. With such an assumption, the user would just
receive a limited number of pseudonyms and the
corresponding keys, which constrains the user to restricted
times of roaming.
The fundamental drawback of the mentioned protocol is
its inappropriate level of security due to the protection of
the user’s location from his home server. Since the foreign
and the home servers do not communicate during the
authentication process, the location of the user remains
unknown for the home server. Therefore the home server
could not divert the calls towards the roaming user. In
addition, since the foreign server could not prove the
provided services to a visitor user, it could not charge its
home server.Inf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, pp. 93–103
i: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2009.01544 Anonymous roaming protocol
In this section, we present an enhanced roaming protocol
which achieves C3 level of security in mobile networks.
Our protocol uses similar functions to Wan et al.’s
(including hashes H1, H2, H3, H4 and the functions e and
h) while eliminates its stated drawbacks and improves the
key issuing procedure. The security of the protocol will be
discussed in the next section.
4.1 Protocol
Again, we assume that a 2-HIBE is implemented in the
system and the servers have received their private keys
{sH1(Si)}. Also, we suppose that the user U obtains his
private key KU ¼ h(kHS, H2(HS‖U )) during the
registration at his home server. However, the structure of
temporary keys has changed signiﬁcantly and the key k
corresponding to a pseudonym Nym is found through
k ¼ e(h(h(H1(HS), H2(HS‖Nym)), H2(HS)), sH1(HS)).
This key will be computed by the user during the roaming
protocol and will be used for the authentication and key
agreement purposes when he enters another FN domain.
In other words, when a user enters a FN domain, he
fetches the pre-processed and unused pair of an alias and
the corresponding temporary key from his memory. He
introduces himself by this alias to the foreign server. Since
the user could not generate a valid temporary key (related
to an alias) without the home server’s assistance, the
temporary key can be interpreted as a warrant to verify
user’s subscription to his home server. Also, this key will be
used in the session key generation. The session key will be
subsequently employed to protect the connection between
the user and the foreign server. Since the user needs a new
pair of a pseudonym and the corresponding key for the
next protocol execution, the key issuing takes place during97
& The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2010
98
&
www.ietdl.orgthe authentication and key agreement protocol. That is the
user chooses an arbitrary alias and drives some
pseudorandom values from this selected alias. Then he
sends these values to the foreign server and asks the foreign
server and the home server to collaborate with him on
the key generation. The protocol is designed such that the
servers do not gain any information about the alias or the
corresponding key. Finally, the user veriﬁes the computed
temporary key with the aid of his private key KU.
As shown in Fig. 2, since we are considering the C3 level of
privacy, we involve the home server in our roaming protocol.
The protocol is as follows:
† When the foreign server detects a new user in his domain,
it generates a nonce Ns and a random number rs (both from
Z∗q) and computes rsP. Then it stores the values Ns and rsP in
his database and sends the ﬁrst message including his identity
IDFS, Ns and rsP to the user.
† Similarly, the user U generates a nonce Nu and a random
number ru and computes k
′
u ¼ rursP. Then he fetches the only
unused pair of (Nym, k) from his memory and computes the
session key to be shared with the foreign server as sku and a
veriﬁer macu according to relations (1) and (2)
sku = H4(k‖k′u‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖1) (1)
macu = H4(k‖k′u‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖0) (2)
After that, he selects an arbitrary Nymnext to be used in
the next execution of the roaming protocol (either in
the current FS or another FS). In order to compute the
corresponding key knext with the help of FS and HS,
the user selects a random number a∗ [ Z∗q and computesThe Institution of Engineering and Technology 2010the following values
x∗1 = h(h(a∗H1(HS), H2(HS‖Nymnext)), H2(HS)) (3)
x∗2 = h(h(a∗H1(HS), H2(HS‖U )), H2(HS)) (4)







2 and EHS(b, U, E (KU, U ), IDFS),
where E(KU, U ) is the symmetric encryption of U with the
key KU. Next, he sends the values EFS(Nym, IDHS), Nu,




1+ a2x∗2 and EHS(b, U, E(KU,
U ), IDFS) to the foreign server.
† Upon receiving the above values, the foreign server checks
if Ns and rsP exist in its database and aborts the connection if
it does not ﬁnd such values. Otherwise, it decrypts EFS(Nym,
IDHS) with its private key sH1(FS) and obtains the Nym and




z = h(h(cH1(HS), H2(HS‖Nym)), H2(HS)) (5)
† Subsequently, the FS sends z and EHS(b, U, E(KU, U),
IDFS) to the HS.
† The home server decrypts the message EHS(b, U, E(KU,
U ), IDFS) with its private key sH1(HS) and checks
whether it has received the messages from the server with
the identity IDFS or not. Then it authenticates the user U
by verifying the correctness of E(KU,U ). The home server
terminates the connection if any of these veriﬁcations fails.
Otherwise, it computes the following values and sends
them back to the FS.
y = e(z, sH1(HS)) (6)
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k∗ = yc−1 (8)
mac∗u = H4(k∗‖k′s‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖0) (9)
The FS rejects the connection if the equality macu ¼ mac∗u
does not hold. Otherwise, it accepts k∗ as the user’s key
corresponding to Nym and authenticates the user. The
computed k∗ together with the message EHS(b, U, E(KU,
U‖b), IDFS) are credentials by which the foreign server will
be able to request the user’s home server for service charge.
Indeed, these values become a proof for payment request.
In the next step, the foreign server computes the session
key sks and the authenticator macs according to relations
(10) and (11)
sks = H4(k∗‖k′s‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖1) (10)
macs = H4(k∗‖k′s‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖2) (11)
Moreover, the foreign server calculates y1 and y2 to make the
computation of knext feasible for the user.
y1 = e(x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS)) (12)
y2 = e(a1x∗1 + a2x∗2, (s − b)H1(HS)) (13)
Finally, it returns macs, y1 and H4( y2) to the user.
† When the user receives the messages from the foreign
server, he computes
mac∗s = H4(k∗‖k′u‖FS‖Nym‖Nu‖Ns‖2) (14)
and checks the equality macs ¼ mac∗s. If it does not hold, the
user aborts the connection. Otherwise, he authenticates the
foreign server and computes the following values
y∗1 = y1 · e(x∗1, bH1(HS)) (15)
knext = (y∗1)a
∗1 (16)




Afterwards, the user considers whether H4( y2) ¼ H4( y∗2)
or not. If the equation holds, he accepts knext as the
key corresponding to Nymnext. If not, he rejects the
connection.
If all the veriﬁcations pass successfully, at the end of the
protocol, the user authenticates the foreign server as a legal
server authorised by the root server and computes a key for
his next alias. Besides, the foreign server authenticates the
user as a certiﬁed user of the home server and informs the
home server about presence of one of its users in its
domain. Nym is the name by which the foreign server
identiﬁes the user (i.e. an identity for the user in theInf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, pp. 93–103
i: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2009.0154foreign server’s domain) and sku ¼ sks is the key that the
user and the home server have agreed upon to be used for
security purposes.
4.2 Proofs
Now we consider the equations employed in the protocol and
present proofs for the less obvious ones. The following
theorems and their corresponding proofs are valid with the
assumption of correctness of the values computed by
different entities.
Theorem 1: The key k∗ computed by the foreign server
through (9) is equivalent to the user’s key k.
Proof:
knext= (y∗1)(a
∗)−1 = [y1e(x∗1, bH1, (HS))](a
∗)−1
= [e(x∗1, (s−b)H1(HS))]e(x∗1, bH1(HS))](a
∗)−1
= [e(x∗1, sH1(HS))](a







Theorem 2: The key knext calculated by the user through
(16) is the key corresponding to Nymnext.
Proof:
knext = (y∗1)(a
∗)−1 = [y1e(x∗1, bH1, (HS))](a
∗)−1
= [e(x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS))]e(x∗1, bH1(HS))](a
∗)−1
= [e(x∗1, sH1(HS))](a








Theorem 3: The value y∗2 in (17) is equivalent to the y2
computed in (13).99




y∗2 = (y1)a1 [e(h(a∗KU, H2(HS)), H1(HS))e(x∗2,
−bH1(HS))]a2
= [e(x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS))]a1 [e(h(a∗h(sH1(HS),
H2(HS‖U )), H2(HS)), H1(HS))e(x∗2,− bH1(HS))]a2




= e(a1x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS))[e(x∗2, sH1(HS))e(x∗2,
− bH1(HS))]a2
= e(a1x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS))[e(x∗2, (s − b)H1(HS))]a2
= e(a1x∗1, (s − b)H1(HS))e(a2x∗2, (s − b)H1(HS))
= e(a1x∗1 + a2x∗2, (s − b)H1(HS)) = y2
A
5 Protocol evaluation and
security analysis
In this section, we evaluate the proposed roaming protocol in
view points of security goals and security levels enumerated in
previous sections. For this purpose, it is necessary to
investigate the structure of temporary keys and the variables
used in the protocol at the ﬁrst instance.
5.1 Evaluating the structure of temporary
keys and other variables in the protocol
In the proposed protocol, the user chooses an arbitrary string
as his next alias and attempts to calculate the corresponding
key. This is carried out with the help of both the current
visited foreign server and the home server during the
authentication and key agreement procedure. To assure the
untraceability and privacy of the user, no information
should be disclosed about Nymnext and knext to neither the
servers nor the eavesdroppers during the key issuing
procedure. The suggested structure for users’ keys is chosen
based on the following requirements:
† A user should not be able to compute a temporary key
corresponding to a pseudonym without the help of his
home server; however, there is no need to inform the home
server of the pseudonym to obtain the related key.
† The user should be able to verify the resultant key by the
help of his permanent private key. Indeed, the user could use
his private key KU to produce a similar structure to the
temporary keys related to his permanent identity U and
exploit the result as a reference in the key veriﬁcation.
According to the speciﬁcations of the bilinear map e and
the linear one-way function h and with the aid of random
values, no information leaks about Nymnext from the
variables sent by the user. These variables include x∗1 and
a1x
∗
1+ a2x∗2. Moreover, the variables y ¼ e(z, sH1(HS)) and0
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server’s key to the foreign server. Also, the user could
not obtain any information about the home server’s
key sH1(HS) by accessing the values y1 ¼ e(x∗1,
(s2 b)H1(HS)), y2 ¼ e(a1x∗1+ a2x∗2, (s2 b)H1(HS)), k and
KU. Hence, he would not be able to calculate the related
key to an alias without the assistance of the home and
foreign servers.
5.2 Veriﬁcation of the computed key
corresponding to the next pseudonym
To assure about the correctness of the calculated knext, the
user computes an auxiliary variable x∗2 and sends a1x
∗
1+ a2x∗2
to the foreign server. Then he computes e(x∗2, sH1(HS)) =
e(h(KU, H2(HS)), H1(HS))
a∗ and uses it as a reference to
decide whether y∗1 in (15) is equal to e(x
∗
1, sH1(HS)) or not.
The correct y∗1 results in a reliable knext. The veriﬁcation
process is carried out corresponding to (15)–(17).
5.3 Mutual authentication between the
user and the visited foreign server
The user and the foreign server mutually authenticate each
other through macs and macu, respectively. Since the
foreign server receives an encrypted pseudonym Nym, it is
able to compute macs only if it knows the private key
sH1(FS). Also, calculation of macu by the user means that
he knows the key k corresponding to Nym, which
subsequently denotes that the user is an authorised
subscriber of his home server.
5.4 Mutual authentication between the
user and his home server
The roaming user has to be ensured that the home server is
informed about his location for routing purposes. It realises
when the user veriﬁes macs since the foreign server needs
the help of the home server in order to compute k which is
used in calculation of macs. Furthermore, the home server
authenticates the user through the message EHS(b, U,
E(KU, U ), IDFS).
5.5 Anonymity of the user
The user makes use of pseudonyms to be identiﬁed by the
foreign servers and no one except the home server gets
aware of the user’s real identity. Moreover, each pseudonym
is used only once and the user chooses a different alias
for the next identiﬁcation. This approach makes the user
untraceable.
5.6 Security against the deposit-case
attack
In the deposit-case attack scenario, a malicious server M
attempts to change the messages from the roaming user to
the foreign server such that the foreign server believes that




www.ietdl.orgtowards M, without being detected by the user nor the real
home server. In our protocol, if a malicious server M
changes the message EFS(Nym, IDHS) in order to replace
IDHS with IDM, the foreign server obtains a false Nym
which could be detected via macu.
5.7 Perfect forward secrecy
Our proposed roaming protocol makes use of elliptic curve-
based Difﬁe–Hellman key exchange protocol to establish a
session key between the user and the foreign server.
Therefore it has perfect forward secrecy. That is, even if an
adversary has compromised all the long-term keys of all the
participants, he could not obtain past session keys. With
the use of Macs, our protocol defends against the man-in-
the-middle attack.
According to the above considerations, our roaming
protocol achieves the C3 level of security. Also, the foreign
server could prove the presence of the home server’s
subscriber in its domain on the strength of the message
EHS(b, U, E (KU, U ), IDFS) and so charges the related
home server.
6 Comparison between the
proposed protocol and the
previous works
Before we present a comparison between the new roaming
protocol and all the previous works, we brieﬂy introduce
the protocol in [11] and compare it with the one
introduced in this paper. The reason behind the selection
of [11] is that this is the only previous roaming protocol
which achieves C2.T Inf. Secur., 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, pp. 93–103
i: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2009.0154The protocol in [11] is shown in Fig. 3. Here, ES(.)
denotes the public key cryptography with the public key of
S. macKU(·) and SigS(.) show the mac produced with KU
and the signature produced by S, respectively. s is the
session ID and g is a generator of a multiplicative group of
order q in which the CDH is assumed to be hard. x and y
are random elements in Z∗q chosen by the roaming user and
the foreign server, respectively.
In the protocol in [11], the roaming user employs an alias
to introduce himself to the foreign server. He sends the
identity of HS together with a nonce for FS. He also sends
the message c1 to be delivered to HS. Upon the receipt of
this message, FS produces a nonce and sends c1 and Ns to
the HS. The HS decrypts c1 and obtains the permanent
key KU. It checks if the key exists in its database and then
checks the validity of macKU(m1, countU, IDHS). HS also
checks if it has received the message from a server with the
identity speciﬁed in m1. If all the veriﬁcations hold, it
sends m2, SIGHS(m2, Ns, IDFS) back to FS. The FS now
obtains the temporary identity (alias) of the roaming user.
Figure 3 Roaming protocol in [11]Table 1 Comparison of implementation and security features between our proposed roaming protocol and the previous ones











Security level C1 C1 C2 C1 unacceptable C5− in
standard UMTS
C3
Communication cost 3L+ 2I 2L+ 2I 2L+ 2I 4L+ 2Ia 4Lb 3L+ 2I
Key veriﬁcation – – – – no yes
Alias concealment from
the HS
yes no alias no no no yes
U/HS authentication mutual mutual mutual mutual no mutual
U/FS authentication mutual mutual mutual mutual mutual mutual
Forward secrecy yes no yes no yes yes
L: local communication, I: inter-domain communication
a2L+ 2I communications are needed for authentication and two extra local communications are needed for key agreement
b2L+ 2I extra communications are needed during the key issuing procedure101
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produces a random number y [ Z∗q, calculates the session
key ( gx)y and sends the message m3macNU(m3, alias) to the
user. Upon receipt of this message, the user checks if mac
is produced properly and then computes the session key
as ( gx)y.
At the end of this protocol, the user and the home server
have mutually authenticated each other. Similarly, the user
and the foreign server have authenticated each other and
agreed upon a session key. However, an eavesdropper can
easily obtain the identity of the user’s home server. Also,
there is no way for the user and FS to assure that they have
obtained the correct session key. As a consequence, the
protocol in [11] provides the security level C2 with the cost
of four communications, but it does not satisfy the key
veriﬁcation characteristic. On the other hand, our proposed
protocol achieves the security level C3 with one additional
local communication, while assures the key veriﬁcation
property. In addition, the aliases in [11] are known for the
home server and it can easily track the user in FN domains,
while they are kept secret towards the home server in our
protocol.
A comparison between the security features of our roaming
protocol and the previous proposed protocols is given in
Table 1. It can be seen that compared to the best
previously proposed protocol in UMTS at [11], our
protocol achieves a higher security level with only one
additional local communication as well as the superiority
that our protocol uses an ID-based cryptosystem instead of
the public key one. The protocol in [14] is also shorter
than our protocol; however, it provides an unacceptable
level of security and even sometimes violates the C2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a secure roaming protocol, which
achieves C3 level of anonymity in mobile networks according
to the classiﬁcation based on Samfat et al.’s work. The
proposed roaming protocol makes use of hierarchical
identity-based cryptosystems instead of public key
cryptosystems, and so there is no need to a PKI. Likewise,
it beneﬁts from two maps introduced by the IBE and
HIBE systems in the key issuing procedure. With an
appropriate usage of these maps properties, we could
involve the visited foreign server, the home server and the
user in the next key generation procedure, while the user is
the only entity who gets aware of the generated key. This
feature improves the privacy (including un-traceability) of
the user. The key issuing is a mandatory procedure and
happens during the authentication and key agreement
protocol. Also, the capability of verifying the generated key
by the user is added to the protocol. We compared our
proposed roaming protocol with the previous works and
demonstrated that it has provided a signiﬁcantly higher
level of privacy for the roaming user.2
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